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ABSTRACT 
 
Through a combination of quantitative budget analysis and qualitative interviews, this thesis 
examines the current state of innovation in the defense industry. The majority of the Department 
of Defense budget is tied up in major weapons acquisitions, but in recent years, there has been an 
increased number of initiatives trying to bridge the gap between government and industry 
(especially venture capital). In addition, technology development has shifted towards private 
industry research in Silicon Valley. Using the DoD’s budget spending trends between 1999-2016, 
this thesis analyzes R&D investment trends to gain a better understanding for areas of government 
interest. Additionally, samples were also gathered from early-stage venture databases to analyze 
private investment trends. This study suggests that there has been increased collaboration between 
R&D organizations within the DoD in recent years. However, the government’s focus & needs are 
still not quite aligned with the investment preferences of the private sector.   
 
Keywords: DoD, military, defense, technology innovation, federal budget, early-stage venture, 
venture capital, military-industrial complex, investment trends 
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SECTION I: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Case for Defense Innovation 
A substantial percent of the United States’ spending is dedicated towards military research and 
military technology development.1 Since the end of the Cold War, military technology has become 
increasingly intertwined with civilian technology.2 This trend has been exacerbated by the 
information technology boom, which the civilian sector currently leads in.3 In previous decades, 
military R&D provided incredibly valuable spin-off technologies to civilian industries. However 
due to increasingly faster innovation cycles, coupled with a more interconnected international 
economy, we have seen a sharp decline in the number of major contractors.4 The military and 
defense world is no longer only comprised of state-to-state arms transfers. Instead, national 
systems of innovation (NSI’s) must be implemented. An NSI is “a network of institutions in the 
public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse 
new technologies.56 NSI’s gained significance in the 1980’s due to increased techno-nationalism 
in the West as a reaction to increase competition from Japan in the tech industry. This was 
aggravated by the end of the Cold War, during which international competition was no longer 
driven by military might, and instead driven by economic & ideological differences.   
 
The defense industry in the United States has historically been seen as a military-industrial 
complex (MIC), or a military-industrial-congressional complex (MICC; otherwise known as the 
“iron triangle”).7 The terms refer to an informal alliance between a nation’s military, the defense 
contractors, and elected officials. In other words: the interests of the military, contractors, and 
Congress are self-reinforcing, incentivizing high government spending on weapons development 
and traditional procurement processes. Such a deeply entrenched system makes systemic reform 
incredibly difficult.  
 
The MICC leads to high barriers to entry in an effort to protect incumbents. Some examples 
include: in-house R&D programs at major contracts funded by the government; a revolving door 
moving people back and forth between the defense department, Congress, and industry; and 
federally-funded researchers.8 The most prominent example of this is Lockheed Martin’s F-35 jet 
fighter, termed the “jet fighter of the future”.9 The $1 trillion (projected) F-35 project is 16 years 
in the making, but is currently delayed by 7 years, and is over budget by 70%.10 Such a project can 
only be prolonged by an intimate, unique relationship with the military and Congress. Defense 
contractors have adopted strategies such as “political engineering”, where companies spread their 
                                                
1 Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The US Federal Budget.  
2 Reppy, Judith. The Place of the Defense Industry in National Systems of Innovation. Cornell University, Peace Studies Program. 
April 2000. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Freeman, Christopher. Technology, Policy, and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan. New York: Pinter. 1987.  
7 Gordon Adams. The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting. Council on Economic Priorities. 1981.  
8 Reppy, Judith. The Place of the Defense Industry in National Systems of Innovation. Cornell University, Peace Studies Program. 
April 2000. 
9 Vox. This jet fighter is a disaster, but Congress keeps buying it. Youtube. January 26, 2017.  
10 Ibid.  
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operations across as many states as possible, creating jobs in different states and thereby gaining 
support from politicians from both parties.11 Indeed, some defense companies have been deemed 
“too big to fail”.12 Lockheed Martin is the Pentagon’s largest and most diverse contractor, and 
currently accounts for $0.10 of every $1 in defense contracting.13 In 2015 alone, Lockheed brought 
in $25 billion in contracts.14 In November 2015, Lockheed acquired helicopter manufacturer 
Sikorsky Aircraft for $9 billion. Not only was this a savvy business move, it was also a political 
one: the Connecticut-based company gave Lockheed a major stake in New England, one of the 
few remaining areas where it previously had relatively little presence and relatively few political 
allies.15 Defense companies spread out their production across many states, and hire subcontractors 
in other countries to ensure a well-connected network and interdependency.16 This quasi-
collaborative relationship between military, government, and industry has allowed defense 
companies to get away with relatively unscathed budgets despite cuts to defense spending: the 
DoD budget decreased from $687 in 2011 to $585 in 2016, but funding for the F-35 did not change 
significantly.17 This becomes an issue when we look at the actual uses of an F-35 in the field. It is 
an all-weather stealth jet designed for both ground and air missions, and is capable of vertical 
landing. It is also one of the “most expensive weapons systems ever developed”.18 Countries like 
Canada have already dropped their purchase commitments from 80 plane to 65 due to the 
investment.19 Yet pulling out from the F-35 problem has political and job consequences: a contract 
representative stated that pulling out from the program means “all remaining aspects, including 
industrial participation and jobs, connected to the program would most likely be reviewed.”20 In 
other words, cancelling the project would be an economic disaster with consequences not only for 
domestic actors, but for America’s foreign relations as well.  
 
Despite being deemed by the media as “too big to fail”, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the defense 
industry has actually experienced major restructuring and shrinkage. The major threats facing 
citizens of the post-Cold War era come from non-state actors and faster technology cycles. The 
US’s major enemies are organized, trained paramilitary units – but even terrorist groups with 
international reach do not have access to a highly organized, technologically advanced airforce. 
The US’s F-35 is also far more advanced than any weapon Russia and China have in their arsenal. 
The changing landscape of national security explains why major defense contractors are shrinking 
in size. Although there was industry growth following September 11th and the subsequent wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, defense contractors have been forced to make cuts.21 The number of 
employees at the largest US defense firms has “dropped 14% from its 2008 peak”.22 Consolidation 
in the defense industry means going from 51 US defense companies in 1980, to 5 large US defense 
                                                
11 Ibid.  
12 Munsil, Leigh. Is Lockheed Martin too big to fail? Politico. August 12, 2015.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Vox. This jet fighter is a disaster, but Congress keeps buying it. Youtube. January 26, 2017. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ciralsky, Adam. Will It Fly? Vanity Fair. September 16, 2013.  
19 Miller, Kathleen. Flawed F-35 too big to kill as Lockheed hooks 45 states. Bloomberg. February 22, 2013.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Wright, Austin. The shrinking defense industry. Politico. August 25, 2014.  
22 Ibid.  
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companies in 1997, to 4 large US defense companies in 2001.23 In 2017, the number of major US 
defense contractors has been reduced down to three: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop 
Grumman. These three make up the largest defense companies in the world, with a combined 2015 
revenue of $109.76 billion.24 However since 2008, these firms have eliminated 70,000 jobs through 
layoffs, buyouts, attrition, or moving employees to the commercial branch.25 In the face of 
continued consolidation, defense contractors have taken a cost-cutting approach to maintain their 
profit margins. Increasingly, the defense industry is driven to reconfigure their business and adopt 
more effective and efficient technologies.   
 
Nonetheless, US military spending is still significant compared to the rest of the world – we boast 
the highest budget of all countries. In addition to cost savings and being able to count on 
government support, defense contractors’ revenue and survival can also be attributed to 
diversification of business lines.  
 
Origins of Defense Innovation 
For the purposes of this paper, a “defense innovation system” is the part of the US national 
innovation system that deals with military and security.26 This includes defense contractors, 
government, universities, R&D institutions, and investors.  
 
The Cold War gave birth to the original US defense innovation system. The two World Wars saw 
the rise of mass-production systems. However, this relatively static system was soon replaced by 
the exponential curve of technology innovation, illustrated by the aerospace industry. Each 
generation of airplanes and missiles far outpaced their earlier models.27 During the Cold War, the 
US gained an edge over the Soviet Union due to dependency on the aerospace and nuclear 
industries. Other fields simply could not keep up with this fast pace. For example, Army weapons 
technology did not improve at the same rate because ground war was “more dependent on human 
factors than strategic factors” which governed air warfare and nuclear deterrence.28 The aerospace 
and nuclear industry became focal points for US defense innovation due to necessity. 
 
The Current State of Defense Innovation 
In March 2016, Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced the establishment of a Defense 
Innovation Advisory Board.29 Carter’s goal was to bridge the gap between Washington and 
private sector innovators in Silicon Valley, in order to “build lasting partnerships between the 
public and private sectors.”30 To many in the defense industry, it was not an unexpected or new 
move. To understand underlying reasons for the initiative’s establishment, we need to look at the 
                                                
23 Stanford. The US Defense Industry and Arms Sales.  
24 Dhiraj, Amarendra. The top 25 largest defense companies in the world, 2015. CEOWorld. February 17, 2016.  
25 Wright, Austin. The shrinking defense industry. Politico. August 25, 2014. 
26 Bracken, Paul, Linda Brandt, Stuart Johnson. The Changing Landscape of Defense Innovation. Defense Horizons, Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy. July 2005. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Department of Defense. Pentagon to Establish Defense Innovation Advisory Board. March 2, 2016.  
30 Ibid.  
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entrenched flaws within the system, and identify why innovation is so difficult to achieve in the 
defense industry.  
 
Every year the Department of Defense (DoD) publishes a report on the Performance of the 
Defense Acquisition System.31 As an executive branch department, the DoD is charged with 
supervising all agencies and functions of the government related directly to national security and 
the US Armed Forces. Employing a staggering 3.2 million people in 2015, it is by far the world’s 
biggest employer.32  
 
Figure 1: Structure of the DoD 
The Secretary of Defense (reports to President) 
The Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Army Navy Air Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff 
   • National Security Agency 
• Defense Intelligence Agency 
• National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, National Reconnaissance 
Office 
• Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) 
• Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
• Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
• Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA) 
• Defense Security Services (DSS) 
• Pentagon Force Protection Agency 
(PFPA) 
 
 
The DoD acquires/procures goods and services from contractors to support its military operations, 
a process that is complex and difficult to change. It often produces systems that fall short of 
performance expectations and exceeds estimated costs.33  
 
The acquisition process can be broken down into three steps:34 
1. JCIDS: the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System – this step identifies 
requirements for a proposed weapon system 
2. PPBE: the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System – this step allocates 
resources and budgeting 
3. DAS: the Defense Acquisition System – this step implements the development and actual 
acquisition of the weapon system 
                                                
31 Department of Defense. Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2015. September 16, 2015.  
32 McCarthy, Niall. The World’s Biggest Employers. Forbes. June 23, 2015.  
33 Schwartz, Moshe. Defense Acquisitions: How DoD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process. 
Congressional Research Service. May 23, 2014.  
34 Ibid.  
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Along the way, the acquisition needs to meet milestones including: technology maturation, risk 
reduction, engineering, manufacturing development, and production initiation. These milestones 
can be problematic to systems that do not meet expected cost and performance.  
 
Both Congress and DoD have made numerous efforts to improve the acquisition system. In May 
2009, Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, which was 
subsequently signed into law.35 This Act included appointing a Director of Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation, a Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation, a Director of Systems 
Engineering, and a requirement that the Director of Defense Research regularly assess the 
technological maturity of the major acquisitions programs.36 However, it is still unclear if these 
appointments actually have a net positive effect on acquisition efficiency and cost reduction. In 
fact, the House Armed Services Committee in 2007 stated: “Simply put, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) acquisition system process is broken. The ability of the department to conduct the 
large scale acquisitions required to ensure our future national security is a concern. The rising costs 
and lengthening schedules of major defense acquisition programs lead to more expensive 
platforms fielded in fewer numbers.”37 
 
While the DoD is not an enterprise and cannot change its mission with the flexibility of a private 
firm, it also plays in a dynamic setting and should always be transforming itself.38 Industry analysts 
have likened the DoD to commercial enterprises that have become more profitable by “exploiting 
new regions of the business landscape”.39 If a business model approach were to be applied to 
national defense, the innovative landscape can be divided into three areas: product, process, and 
legacy system retrofitting.40 The product category include acquisitions of airplanes, tanks, and 
ships. However, this category is also the most expensive, as “new hardware is costlier due to its 
added complexity and the need for extensive contractor support”.41 Therefore, many researchers 
have recommended shifting DoD resources to the second and third categories, to realize more 
value from defense investments.  
 
What makes the procurement category so difficult to manage? Bracken (2005) identifies two major 
trends: complexity and integrated systems.42 Modern weapons and support systems are 
significantly more complex than historical technologies. This means there is greater demand for 
expert knowledge and skills required to maintain the complex network. In Rescuing Prometheus, 
Thomas Hughes, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, argues that the military’s primary 
challenge is in the application of broad managerial innovations that allowed it to constitute 
America’s “most impressive technological achievement”.43 The Atlas Project of the 1950s 
                                                
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.  
37 H. Rept. 109-452. Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representative on H.R. 5122. May 5, 2006.  
38 Bracken, Paul, Linda Brandt, Stuart Johnson. The Changing Landscape of Defense Innovation. Defense Horizons, Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy. July 2005.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Hughes, Thomas P. Rescuing Prometheus. Pantheon Books. 1998.  
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produced the first intercontinental ballistic missile, changing the dynamics of the Cold War. What  
made the Project a success was not solely its design, but the “18,000 scientists, engineers, and 
technical experts in universities and industry; 70,000 people from office to factory floor in twenty-
two industries, directly and actively participating, 17 associated contractors and 200 subcontractors 
with 200,000 suppliers, and about 500 military officers with technical expertise.”44 While we are 
decades past the Cold War era, the lesson remains the same: in order to innovate, it is not enough 
to only make breakthroughs in R&D. In reality, engineers and scientists often find that 
management presents more of a barrier than R&D itself.45 Hughes argues that the “present day 
preeminence of the United States if the creation of large systems arises in large part because of its 
managerial prowess.”46 That is, the challenge of the defense industry is not science, but the 
orchestration of complex systems. In order to innovate the DoD, one must innovate not only the 
technology, but the managerial/organizational components as well.   
 
This is especially true as the integration process has become just as critical, if not more, than the 
individual components themselves.47 The innovation landscape has shifted to technologies such as 
sensor integration, grid computing, and middleware. This poses a problem for the DoD, because it 
has traditionally done a bad job at acquiring these technologies. Historically, military systems fared 
well in a world where the costs of adopting new technology were low.48 However, the increased 
pervasiveness and complexity of technology has unintended consequences for contractors support 
agencies, and the DoD.  
 
Secretary Asher’s Defense Innovation Advisory Board is not the first of its kind. In November 
2014, Secretary Chuck Hagel established the Defense Innovation Initiative, the precursor to the 
DIAB, to be headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work.49 In an era where “American 
dominance in key warfighting domains is eroding”, Hagel stated we “must find new and creative 
ways to sustain and expand the US’s advantages with increasingly limited resources.”50 
 
In subsequent years, the DoD has maintained that the Defense Innovation Initiative’s associated 
activities remain top priorities.51 Following Hagel’s term, Secretary Carter continued and furthered 
defense innovation through additional initiatives. These included the declassification of the 
Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) led by Dr. Will Roper – which was originally established in 
2012 with the aim of ensuring America’s military & technology leadership by merging 
technologies across multiple platforms and services.52 Several examples of the SCO’s work include 
“adapting the hypervelocity projectile for the Navy’s existing conventional naval artillery gun 
                                                
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Bracken, Paul, Linda Brandt, Stuart Johnson. The Changing Landscape of Defense Innovation. Defense Horizons, Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy. July 2005.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Hagel, Chuck. The Defense Innovation Initiative. November 15, 2014.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Center for Strategic & International Studies. Defense Acquisition Trends, 2016 Report: The End of the Contracting Drawdown. 
CSIS. March 2017.  
52 Ibid.  
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pieces” and “making the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) capable of targeting naval 
targets”.53 The SCO’s success is reinforced by its increased year-on-year budget.  
 
Another one of Secretary Carter’s initiatives is the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental 
(DIUx). Created in August 2014, the DIUx is given a small budget of $30 million to strengthen 
ties between the Pentagon and Silicon Valley, and to “accelerate the development and acquisition 
of new technologies useful to the military”.54 The DIUx’s managing partner, Raj Shah, was 
previously an F16 pilot in the US Air Force and was active in the missions like Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. During his service, Shah came across numerous instances where the US military’s 
technology was too outdated to be relied on. For example, there were times when Shah was piloting 
and the F16 plane’s multimillion-dollar mil-spec software could not tell him if he was currently 
flying over Iraq or Iran.55 In fact, the US military’s technology was being outstripped by 
commercial technologies. In response, Secretary Carter established a top-down approach to 
addressing this issue. Back in 2000, Carter wrote a paper called Keeping the Edge, where he 
predicted that the DoD would need to form partnerships with the private sector to maintain 
America’s strategic dominance.56 “While the US military capability for joint operations is 
unquestionably the best in the world,” he writes, “the backroom of the DoD – contracting, 
personnel policies, and managerial practices – is not up to the standards found elsewhere in our 
society.”57 The DIUx currently employs around 40 people, comprised of a mix between civilians, 
military, and contractors, and its Mountain View headquarters have an unmistakable Silicon 
Valley startup vibe. The DIUx’s goal was ambitious and fresh: to tap into existing projects at 
startups and companies, and adapt them for national security uses.58 However beyond the surface, 
the DIUx has run into more hurdles than successes - and the root of the problem usually has to do 
with organizational issues rather than technological ones.  
 
Isaac Taylor is a former Google executive who designed and built its first self-driving cars, and 
became operations director of Google X. Taylor witnessed firsthand the consequences of cultural 
divides: whereas Silicon Valley startups typically move at a fast pace, the Pentagon’s culture 
requires meetings after meetings, sometimes with no contract signed even after 18 months.59 For 
example. ShieldAI is a company based in San Diego that build a small, autonomous indoor drone. 
The DIUx identified an application of the product for Special Ops: soldiers might want to know 
the inside of a building or cave. Despite “palpable interest”, ShieldAI never ended up selling to 
DoD.60 To form a contract, the Pentagon’s culture requires meetings after meetings, which might 
or might not lead to an R&D contract in a couple of years, followed by testing, approval, and 
renewed competition for another contract, assessments, etc.61 Simply put, a cash-strapped startup 
in the Valley with investors to answer to and a venture capital exit timeline of ~5 years cannot put 
                                                
53 Ibid.  
54 Kaplan, Fred. The Pentagon’s Innovation Experiment. MIT Technology Review. December 19, 2016.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Carter, Ashton B & John P White. Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future. Preventive Defense Project, the Kennedy 
School of Government at Harvard University. 2000.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Kaplan, Fred. The Pentagon’s Innovation Experiment. MIT Technology Review. December 19, 2016. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid. 
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up with such delay. Between initial talks and the Pentagon actually signing a contract, ShieldAI’s 
technology probably “would have changed three times” in the interim.62  
 
To minimize consequences of this cultural mismatch, the DIUx made a few necessary changes, 
and rebranded itself as DIUx 2.0. These changes included: setting strict deadlines for the Pentagon 
to close a deal, mandating a direct line to Secretary Carter from the DIUx management team, and 
bringing in more expert knowledge.63 The DIUx team were all inspired by the existing Defense 
Advanced Research Projets Agency (DARPA), which is the DoD’s research division. However 
DARPA’s main structural flaw is that it does not have influence over actual commercialization 
and production. For a DARPA project to be produced, it needs to go through a strenuous set of 
Pentagon procurement bureaus.64 This gap between research and production is termed “the valley 
of death” even by those in administration. That being said, DARPA runs several initiatives 
designed to support transition and commercialization for funded projects. Congress mandates the 
DoD Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer 
(STTR) programs, a collaboration between the DoD and the Small Business Administration.65 
Every year, 2,500 proposals are awarded a research grant for commercialization purposes, with $1 
billion in research funded annually.66  
 
The DIUx has averaged a period of 59 days between an initial project proposal and a signed 
contract, across all 12 projects they have taken on.67 Most optimistically, the DIUx portfolio 
included companies who had not thought about military applications, and no one in the military 
were previously aware such companies existed.68 DIUx was able to bridge this knowledge gap in 
numerous cases. Last year, two new DIUx branches opened, one in Austin and one in Boston. 
However going forward, the fate of the DIUx is in doubt. While the DIUx has not yet produced 
any substantially game-changing innovations, its existence proves the need for better public-
private partnerships, if not only for a knowledge-sharing purpose.  
 
New administrations usually replace their predecessor’s program, especially if their predecessor 
was of the opposite party.69 The DIUx’s budget was recently restricted by the 2017 National 
Defense Authorization Act.70 Since 2016, the DIUx has signed 25 contracts worth $48 million, and 
$12.3 million was awarded to contracts since 2016 Q4. These contracts included technologies for 
unmanned aerial systems, autonomous indoor drone systems, non-invasive cooling technology for 
battlefield medicines, and multifactor authentication for network access.71 However, Shah said in 
a recent interview that he does not remain worried: most of the companies in the DIUx portfolio 
are also privately-funded, and venture capitalist have already invested over $1.5 billion into them.72 
                                                
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Small Business Innovation Research. About the SBIR/STTR Program.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Kaplan, Fred. The Pentagon’s Innovation Experiment. MIT Technology Review. December 19, 2016. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Carberry, Sean D. “Full speed” at DIUx, says chief. FCW, the Business of Federal Technology. April 21, 2017.  
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  
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Furthermore, the management team also disclosed they have 20 additional projects in their 
pipeline, focusing on the following areas: autonomy, information technology, life sciences, space, 
and artificial intelligence.73  
 
In short, Secretary Carter overhauled the DIUx leadership early on, and has started to change the 
way the DoD thinks about failure. Instead of incentivizing “late failures”, which are public and 
expensive, the DIUx is shifting towards a startup model of “failing fast and iterating”.74 In other 
words, starting to see “early failures” as opportunities to learn. Ultimately though, the long-term 
success of the DIUx should be measured in practical innovations and commercialized technologies 
with tangible impact. To deliver on Carter’s bold promises, technological innovation is not enough: 
management, execution, and organizational structure all play a part.  
 
The DIUx is not the only organization taking advantage of exponential technology advancement 
in the private sector. Hacking for Defense (H4D) at Stanford University was established to apply 
the Lean Launchpad methodology to national security problems.75 Startups have learned to operate 
extremely efficiently with limited resources and time, something that national security initiatives 
have difficulty replicating during peacetime. H4D compiles student teams and enables them to 
take on actual national security problems. At the 2016 Wharton Aerospace Ventures conference, 
Hacking for Defense founder Steve Blank highlighted that the US’s adversaries have speed on 
their side, and that the intelligence community needs to “function more like Silicon Valley”.76 
Hacking for Defense and similar initiatives directly address the problem of innovating 
organizational structures and organizational culture. These initiatives realize that technology 
innovation is not the limiting factor: rather, it is the application, implementation, and translational 
hurdles that prevent a more efficient and effective defense system.   
 
Defense Spending in the Federal Budget  
US federal spending can be classified into 3 categories: mandatory, discretionary, and interest on 
debt. Interest on debt only accounts for a fraction of spending, while mandatory and discretionary 
accounts for over 90% of all federal spending (outlays).77 The Department of Defense’s budget 
falls under discretionary spending, which is decided by Congress through an appropriations 
process every year. Discretionary spending is broken down further to defense-related and 
nondefense-related. Nondefense-related activities include childhood education programs, food & 
agriculture, energy & environment, science, transportation, housing & community, education, and 
veterans’ benefits.78 
 
Congress typically allocates slightly more than half of discretionary spending to military and 
defense. This accounts for ~5% of total US GDP allocated to annual defense spending. In 2016, 
total discretionary outlays increased by $15 billion. Defense outlays specifically increased by $0.4 
                                                
73 Bertuca, Tony. DIUx announces quarterly results. Inside Defense. April 18, 2017.  
74 Fitzferald, Ben. The DIUx is Dead. Long Live the DIUx. Defense One. May 12, 2016.  
75 Hacking for Defense (H4D): Developing Technology Solutions for National Security. hacking4defense.stanford.edu 
76 Blank, Steve. Keynote Speech. Wharton Aerospace Ventures 2016. The Wharton School, San Francisco. April 21, 2016.  
77 National Priorities Project. Federal Spending: Where Does the Money Go?  
78 Ibid.  
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billion, to a total of $584 billion.79 However, this increase was due to a shift in the payment date 
for military compensation. If this shift had not occurred, outlays would have declined in nominal 
terms to $580 billion, which would have been the first decrease since 2011.  
 
In 2016, the defense budget totaled 3.2% of US GDP, which was a significant decline compared 
to previous years. For example, defense spending in 2010 totaled 4.7% of GDP.  
 
In March 2017, President Trump proposed a $54 billion increase in defense spending, which is 
intended to provide increased funding to the fight against ISIS.80 This 10% increase (to $639 billion 
for fiscal year 2018) in defense spending will cause cuts to nondefense spending. Currently, there 
are spending caps imposed upon the military due to an act Obama enacted in 2013 – and increased 
defense spending can only be implemented if the Senate approves with at least 60 votes in favor 
of Trump’s proposal. If approved by Congress, Trump’s budget will come into effect in the new 
fiscal year on October 1.81 It would also be the largest boost for the military since President 
Reagan’s buildup in the 1980s.82 
 
While $3 billion of the proposed increased budget would be put towards fighting ISIS, a substantial 
portion will also go towards modernizing “helicopters, F-35 and F/A 18 fighter jets, tactical 
missiles and unmanned aircrafts.”83 In other words, improving the state of warfighting readiness 
through improved technology and innovation.  
 
While the issue of defense spending has proven itself to be a divisive topic due to its repercussions 
to nondefense programs in the discretionary spending category, a fair number people would agree 
that military innovation is a necessary program to invest in. Gallup’s annual polls indicated that 
slightly more Americans believe the US spends “too little” on military & defense than “too 
much”.84 These statistics indicate significantly more Republican support for increased military 
strength; while 62% of Republicans say the US spends too little, only 15% of Democrats agree.85  
 
Nevertheless, it is very important to note that spending does not necessarily equate to better 
effectiveness, preparedness, and innovation. Increasing spending without improving bureaucratic 
traditions and streamlining technological progress is counterproductive and a waste of taxpayer 
dollars.  
 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Spending in the Defense Budget 
Within the defense budget, the largest program is Operations and Maintenance. Of the $584 billion 
2016 defense budget, a little under half ($242 billion) was allocated towards this department. 
Meanwhile, $103 billion was allocated to Procurement, $141 billion was allocated to Military 
Personnel, $65 billion was allocated to Research & Development, and $33 billion was allocated to 
                                                
79 Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027. January 2017.  
80 Cohen, Zachary. Trump proposes $54 billion defense spending hike. CNN Politics. March 16, 2017.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Fox News. Trump budget seeks defense spending boost, major cuts in other agencies. March 16, 2017.  
83 Ibid.  
84 Gallup. “1 in 3 Americans Say US Spends Too Little on Defense.” March 2, 2017.  
85 Ibid.  
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Other spending programs such as: military construction, family housing, and defense-related 
agencies outside the DoD (ex. Department of Energy’s atomic energy programs).86  
 
Relatively speaking however, the DoD represents the largest federal investor in research.87 49% of 
all federal R&D is allocated each year to the DoD, while the Department of Health and Human 
Services, Department of Energy, NASA, NSF, and Department of Agriculture collectively make 
up the remaining 51%.88 Of all R&D departments in the federal government, the DoD’s R&D 
branch has the most established quasi-fiduciary relationship with commercial outcomes of its own 
funding.89 Importantly, the DoD also pursue research in basic sciences – something that not every 
high-tech startup in Silicon Valley is willing to invest in. The outputs of DoD research is 
commercialized primarily through large defense contractors instead of small firms.90  
 
But as the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation states, “It’s no longer enough to 
simply fund scientific and engineering research and hope it gets translated into commercial 
results.”91 The DoD understands this, and tasks its R&D department with commercialization goals 
as well – whether or not research outcomes end up being commercialized. The DoD also has 
licensing arrangements with private companies, and between 2000 and 2014, paid these private 
companies $3.4 billion for military applications of commercialized technology.92 This is beneficial 
because of spillover effects: even if the DoD does not end up ushering a specific technology 
through its arduous procurement process, licensing allows these technologies to be used in more 
diverse ways, even outside of the military. Currently, the technology licensing space is dominated 
by large defense contractors. However, due to increased military need for innovation in industries 
such as “software, material science, autonomous systems and vehicles, energy, and medical 
devices”, the DoD will need to diversify and expand its scope of suppliers to include more small- 
and medium-sized businesses.93  
 
Researchers and leaders in the defense industry have already made several proposals to the new 
Trump administration for increasing the breadth of R&D-based procurement. Most of these 
proposals center around creating a “network of applied defense R&D facilities around regional 
technology clusters, similar to Manufacturing USA.”94 Because the DoD currently has existing 
laboratories in 22 states, it will be easy to shift research & commercialization strategies to align 
with adjacent technology clusters, such as in Silicon Valley.95 
 
                                                
86 Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Federal Budget in 2016: A Closer Look at Discretionary Spending.  
87 Ezell, Stephen and Scott Andes. Localizing the economic impact of research and development: Policy proposals for the Trump 
administration and Congress. Information Technology & Innovation Foundation. The Bass Initiative on Innovation and 
Placemaking at Brookings. December 2016. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid.   
92 Department of Defense. National Economic Impacts from DoD License Agreements with US Industry: 2000-2014. 2016.  
93 Ibid.  
94 Andes, Scott. Maximizing the Local Economic Impact of Federal R&D. Brookings Institution. 2016.  
95 Ezell, Stephen and Scott Andes. Localizing the economic impact of research and development: Policy proposals for the Trump 
administration and Congress. Information Technology & Innovation Foundation. The Bass Initiative on Innovation and 
Placemaking at Brookings. December 2016. 
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There are some clear historical trends in defense-related federal R&D spending. The percentage 
of defense-related spending started to decrease in the mid-1960s.96 Fig. 2, from the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), illustrates this trend clearly: while federal 
R&D spending was primarily defense-focused prior to 1960, both nondefense and overall R&D 
spending increased drastically afterwards.97 Within the DoD, R&D spending has historically 
focused on weapons (Fig. 3), which continues to be the case.98  
 
 
Figure 2             Figure 3 
In addition, the types of DoD research is comprised mostly of basic, applied, and advanced tech 
(Fig. 4).99 But what really sets the DoD apart from other federal branches, is its focus on 
development in addition to research. Fig. 5 demonstrates this very clearly: while most departments 
conduct specialized R&D, the DoD is responsible for almost all development.100 
 
 
Figure 4           Figure 5 
                                                
96 American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Federal Spending on Defense and Nondefense R&D. 2016.  
97 Ibid.  
98 American Association for Advancement of Science. Trends in Defense R&D. 2016.  
99 American Association for Advancement of Science. Trends in DoD Science & Technology. 2016.  
100 American Association for Advancement of Science. Trends in Development by Agency, FY 2000-2017. 2016.  
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It is important to note that R&D spending does not equate to actual technologies being deployed 
in the field. Subrata Ghoshroy, a research associate at MIT, argues that most of US casualties “in 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been caused by improvised explosive devices, which require 
little in the way of technology beyond mobile phones used to detonate them … the United States’ 
high-technology, high-price, and high-maintenance weaponry is of relatively little value in such 
conflicts.”101 In 2011 the US spent $76 billion on defense R&D, a figure that exceeds the entirety 
of defense spending in every country except China.102 Cutting R&D, Ghoshroy points out, will 
result in push-back from universities, defense contractors, and media in the form of negative press. 
Supporting R&D spending is a safe and non-controversial stance to take, especially for politicians. 
However, it is not clear whether military R&D actually produces scientific and technical 
knowledge widely applicable within and outside the DoD: most of R&D spending might as well 
revolve around building expensive gadgets that fail to reach performance standards.103 Ghoshroy 
argues that instead of looking at spending levels, we should look at structure.  
 
From the literature, we can conclude that defense innovation is a vital component of national 
defense and security, and that it is deeply flawed. The rest of this paper will focus on expanding 
existing knowledge and adding my own findings.   
                                                
101 Alterman, Eric. Is Defense R&D Spending Effective? Center for American Progress. January 13, 2012.  
102 Ghoshroy, Subrata. Restructuring defense R&D. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. December 20, 2011.  
103 Ibid.  
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SECTION II: DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
Purpose of This Paper 
The goal of this paper is to analyze both government and private industry’s interest in defense 
technologies, especially more recent innovations. Initiatives such as the DIAB and DIUx were 
established to bridge the gap between DoD and startups, so the DoD can capture economic & 
technological advantages of commercial products.  
 
The question this paper addresses is: “How has interest in defense innovation manifested itself 
in practice over time, in government vs private sector?”  
 
To answer this overarching question, this paper focuses on two specific sub-questions:  
1. How successfully has the DoD’s R&D branch adapted to faster innovation cycles? 
2. How well do these spending patterns align with private industry investment preferences?  
 
Relevance and Importance of This Paper  
These questions are important because the current literature primarily focuses on general R&D 
spending as a whole, or in very broad terms. For example, the AAAS puts out an annual analysis 
of the President’s budget.104 While comprehensive & robust, this report only focuses on the total 
amount of funding allocated to R&D compared to other discretionary spending. This means that 
the focus is not on the breakdown of R&D spending categories, but rather a comparison across the 
entire federal budget as a whole. The report does a good job of summarizing what the 
Administration prioritizes in overall R&D – jobs, technology, low-carbon energy, life sciences, 
climate, infrastructure. However, this report (and similar reports) misses out on the potential in-
depth analysis that can be conducted on the nuances of R&D spending, and how year-on-year 
changes can signify changing government interest in specific technologies.  
 
Furthermore, existing reports and publications do not compare across public and private sectors. 
Instead, they tend to focus on analyzing either government spending or private investments – but 
there is rarely a dual comparison in the defense industry that is conducted with sufficient detail.  
 
In order to analyze a more specific aspect of defense innovation, I created a 3-part approach that 
combines quantitative analysis with qualitative interviews, and compares both federal R&D 
defense-specific spending with venture capital investments in defense-specific early-stage 
ventures.  
 
PART A: DoD R&D Spending Trends 
 
Background 
While R&D spending in the DoD’s annual budget is not the best approximation of innovation by 
itself, it still plays a vital component in the ecosystem. Most reports and analysis focus on general 
                                                
104 Hourihan, Matt. Federal R&D in the FY 2016 Budget: An Overview. AAAS. 2016.  
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R&D investment trends, looking at overall spending patterns across years, or across a broad range 
of categories within R&D spending.105 However, I wanted to make more detailed inferences on the 
types of technologies the DoD has invested in. The intent was to use investment as a proxy for 
interest.  
 
R&D spending is only one program within the defense budget. The defense budget is documented 
according to the following streams: US Army, US Navy, US Air Force, Component Base 
Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operation Transfer Fund (OCOTF), 
Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Overseas 
Contingency Operations Syria Training and Equipment Fund (STEF), Overseas Contingency 
Operations Iraq Training and Equipment Fund (ITEF), IT, and Defense Wide.  
 
Defense Wide Budget: All Programs 
The Defense Wide budget is comprised of the following programs: 
1. Operations and Maintenance 
2. Procurement 
3. Research, Development, Test & Evaluation 
4. Family Housing 
5. Base Realignment and Closure 
6. Defense Working Capital Fund 
7. Military Construction 
8. Defense Health Program 
9. NATO Security Investment Program 
 
Dataset: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (in the Defense Wide Budget) 
This paper focuses on spending within Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E). 
Unclassified spending documentation is put out annually by the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller). 106 Primary data was obtained from publicly available, unclassified database 
published by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. The specific datasets of interest were 
the DoD’s spending in RDT&E. The available datasets span fiscal years 1999-2016. I excluded 
years 2000 & 2001, because the datasets for these two years did not include the necessary 
information.  
 
The RDT&E program includes 23 sub-organizations, as seen in Fig. 6 All 23 of these organizations 
are involved, or have in the past been involved with, an R&D project. Fig. 6 shows the breakdown 
of organizations as well as their acronym in budget documents.    
 
Figure 6: Agencies included within Research, Development, Test & Evaluation in the DoD budget. 
Columns indicate the organization's code in the budget data for respective years. 
2007-present 2002-2006 2002 & prior** Organization 
                                                
105 Serbu, Jared. Defense contracting rebounded in 2016, but R&D spending continues to suffer. Federal News Radio. April 10, 
2017.  
106 comptroller.defense.gov/budget-materials 
WH 399: Wharton Senior Research Seminar 
Innovation in the Defense Industry 
Prepared by Julia Peng for Professor Adam Grant & Dr. Utsav Schurmans on May 9, 2017 
 
 18 
AF F F Air Force 
ARMY A A Army 
BTA * D Defense Business Transformation Agency 
CBDP BP D Chemical & Biological Defense Program 
CIFA BZ D Counter Intelligence Field Activity 
DARPA E D Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DCMA BL D Defense Contract Management Agency 
DHA * D Defense Health Agency 
DHRA SE D DoD Human Resources Agency 
DISA K D Defense Information Systems Agency 
DLA S D Defense Logistics Agency 
DSCA T D Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
DSS V D Defense Security Service 
DTRA BR D Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
MDA C D Missile Defense Agency 
NAVY N N Navy 
NSA * D National Security Agency 
OSD D D Office of Secretary of Defense 
OTE DO D Operational Test & Evaluation 
SOCOM BB D Special Operations & Command 
TJS * D The Joint Staff 
WHS * D Washington Headquarters Service 
DTIC BK D Defense Technical Information Center 
* these organizations were either not established in 2006, or was not classified under RDT&E 
** for years 2002 & prior, there were only 4 codes: A, F, N, and D for all Defense Wide programs 
 
I downloaded all RDT&E datasets for years 1999-2016, excluding 2000 & 2001. Each year’s data 
was originally organized in an Excel spreadsheet, with the following column headers and my 
description:  
 
Figure 7: Organization of RDT&E budget datasets for 1999-2016. 
Column Heading Explanation 
Account Internal accounting methodology; not useful for this paper 
Account Title Internal accounting methodology; not useful for this paper 
Organization Agencies acronyms listed in Table 1  
Budget Activity 01 Basic Research 
02 Applied Research 
03 Advanced Technology Development  
04 Advanced Component Development & Prototypes 
05 System Development & Demonstration 
06 RDT&E Management Support 
07 Operational Systems Development 
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20 Undistributed  
Line Number Internal accounting methodology; not useful for this paper 
Program Element Number (PE) Internal accounting methodology; “9999999999” denotes 
Classified Programs 
Program Element Title The specific research projects. Examples: Defense Research 
Sciences, University Research Sciences, Missile 
Technology, Medical Technology, Night Vision Advanced 
Technology, Landmine Warfare, Broadcast Service, 
Aerospace Sensors, etc.  
Include in TOA Internal accounting methodology 
FY (Base & OCO) Total actual amount spent two years ago  
Previous FY Base Enacted Last year’s actual amount spent  
Previous FY OCO Enacted Last year’s actual amount spent on overseas contingency 
Previous FY Total Enacted Last year’s Base Enacted + OCO Enacted 
FY Base  Amount budgeted for this year  
FY OCO Amount budgeted for this year on overseas contingency 
FY Total Total amount budgeted  
 
Data Cleaning & Processing 
Firstly, I sorted all 16 years by their Program Element number and excluded Classified Programs. 
Due to their confidential nature, I was not able to draw any conclusions from their budget 
allocation. Secondly, I sorted the data by Budget Activity and excluded the few Undistributed 
projects. The exclusion of these two types of data did not impact the quality or quantity of 
remaining data points.  
 
A Short Overview of the Federal Government’s Accounting Methods 
The federal government uses baseline budgeting to develop a budget proposal for future years.107 
This methodology is used by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, and is followed by the federal government’s various Budget Committees. Baseline 
budgeting originated in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, requiring the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to “prepare projections of federal spending for the upcoming 
fiscal year based on a continuation of the existing level of government services.” Twice a year 
(January or August), the CBO prepares baseline projections of surplus, deficit, revenues, and 
outlays. The projections assume current budgetary policies and programs are continued – however, 
the projections are not forecasts. The budget begins with the current year’s budget and adjusts 
according to actual spending, inflation, projections for new expenditures, and additional capital 
expenditures for new programs. For defense and discretionary non-defense programs prior to 2002, 
the baseline budgeting methodology assumes that Congress adheres to “statutory caps on budget 
authority and outlays”. After the caps expired in 2002, the CBO began to assume that spending 
grows at the rate of inflation.  
 
                                                
107 Water, Paul van de. Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. Congressional Budget Office. “CBO Testimony”. April 1, 1998.  
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Because budgets are forecasts and are compiled in the previous year, several things need to be 
considered. Firstly, it is important to use the most recent Amendment to the dataset, to get the most 
recent budget forecasts. Secondly, all Overseas Contingency Operations Funding (OCO funding) 
were included in the final budget. The OCO funds are also referred to as “war funds” or 
“emergency funds”, and is a separate budget jointly managed by the DoD and the State 
Department.108 These funds are not subject to procedural limits on discretionary spending, or to the 
spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA).109 Congress must designate 
OCO funding on an account-by-account basis, and the President is also required to designate funds 
under OCO after appropriation, for it to be available for expenditure.110 The OCO is additional to 
the DoD’s base budget, and was originally set up to finance the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.111 It 
continues to be a source of funding for the Pentagon, and is not subject to sequestration cuts that 
affects the rest of the base budget. Sequestration is what makes the OCO funds controversial, and 
Secretary Carter has previously stated that they are “a road to nowhere”.112 OCO funds are 
requested separately from the base budget, but the two are added together to obtain the final budget. 
Despite the controversial nature of the OCO funds, I chose to include them in my analysis because 
they do indicate which categories need what kind of funding. Thirdly, it is important to consider 
the enacted base & enacted OCO from 2 years prior to the current budget proposal. For example, 
the 2015 budget is compiled mid-way in 2014, which means the only actual spending information 
is from 2013.  
 
Data Analysis: General Spending Allocations  
I conducted the following analyses & tests to gain a better understanding of R&D spending trends 
across the past decade. All of these tests were conducted individually for each of the 16 years of 
available data, and the corresponding statistical tests:  
1. Analysis of Organization and Budget Activity: performed a contingency analysis on how 
much of each type of Budget Activity (01 – 07) is allocated towards each Organization. 
For example: what proportion of Basic Research is being conducted by the Army versus 
by the Missile Defense Agency?  
a. Organization on BudgetActivity 
2. Analysis of funding amount based on Budget Activity: performed a oneway analysis 
comparing how much funding goes into each Budget Activity. For example: how much is 
being spent on Basic Research vs on Development & Prototyping? This can be a good 
indicator of how far along a big research project is.   
a. FundingAmount on BudgetActivity 
3. Analysis of funding amount based on Organization: performed a oneway analysis 
comparing how much funding goes into each Organization. For example: how much is 
being allocated towards DARPA vs towards the Chemical & Biological Defense Program? 
This can be a good indicator of which threats the DoD is most concerned about.  
a. FundingAmount on Organization 
                                                
108 National Priorities. Overseas Contingency Operations: The Pentagon Slush Fund. N.d.  
109 Williams, Lynn M. Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status. Congressional Research Service. 
February 7, 2017.  
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid.  
112 Pellerin, Cheryl. Carter Urges Senators to Support Stable Defense Budget. Department of Defense. May 6, 2015.  
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4. Analysis of funding amount difference based on Budget Activity: performed a oneway 
analysis comparing yearly funding changes to Budget Activity. For example, did the DoD 
make any significant allocation changes to Advanced Technology Development between 
2016 and 2015?   
a. FundingAmountDiff on BudgetActivity 
5. Analysis of funding amount difference based on Organization: performed a oneway 
analysis comparing yearly funding changes to Organization. For example, did the Missile 
Defense Agency significantly gain or lose funding between 2016 and 2015?  
a. FundingAmountDiff on Organization 
 
Data Analysis: Specific Program Elements (Projects)  
The more difficult analysis of spending trends however, was tracking spending on specific projects 
within the RDT&E budget over the 16-year period. The purpose of this analysis was to determine 
how DoD’s research interest has changed in the past decade, to keep up with faster technology 
cycles and new innovations.  
 
This analysis was conducted by identifying all 907 individual projects that were included in the 
2016 budget – either as a continuation of a project from previous years, or a new project altogether. 
I created a separate data table for each year’s Project Element column, and merged the 16 tables 
together with the help of Excel’s functions. It is important to note that an initiative’s budget can 
be spread across numerous organizations. For example, the Program Element “Medical 
Development” can be jointly managed by the Defense Health Program, the Navy, the Army, and 
DARPA – each with an independent, but related, research project. Therefore, I also made sure to 
match each initiative with its respective organization.  
 
From this, it is possible to identify funding amounts for a specific project in any year between 
1999-2016, excluding 2000 & 2001.  
 
PART B: Early-Stage Defense Ventures 
 
Background  
“Despite the pace of global technological change, the United States military-industrial complex 
may never be truly disrupted. We need it too much.”113 Many people criticize the robust ecosystem 
of relationships between government, military, and contractors – however the traditional structure 
is what enables the development and manufacturing of warships, warplanes, and advanced 
munitions. Unlike some other industries, the defense industry has proven itself nearly impervious 
to smaller companies from Silicon Valley.114 To address this, career military officer Jason Tama 
argues that instead of acquisition reform, we should focus more on reframing the challenge from 
the perspective of business executives and venture capitalists.115  
 
                                                
113 Tama, Jason. How to Get Startups in on the Military-Industrial Complex. Wired. July 8, 2015.  
114 Ibid.  
115 Ibid.  
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There is no doubt that leveraging innovation is vital to our long-tern national security. Increasingly, 
battles are being fought in cyberspace, and progression being governed by Moore’s Law. The key 
to a successful collaboration between government and the innovative industry is speed. Many 
venture capitalists believe the rigidity of the acquisition system to be “incompatible with the speed 
and growth necessary to survive in today’s technology markets”.116 
 
Despite this inherent difference, it is becoming increasingly easier for government and industry to 
work together. In fact, US military and intelligence research organizations have been major players 
in funding defense and security startups. Since the 1980s, DARPA has been funding projects such 
as the Advanced Research Agency Network (ARPANET), and has continued to fund research 
projects for defense applications. CB Insights released a report of their top 12 defense- and 
intelligence-related startups in 2016, shown in Fig.8.117 None of the startups have raised beyond 
Series C, and all 12 raised during or after 2015.  
 
The top investors in this space include DARPA (for seed-stage), In-Q-Tel (the investment division 
of the CIA), Arsenal Venture Partners (which manages OnPoint Ventures for the US Army), and 
General Catalyst. Since 2011, the combination of In-Q-Tel, DARPA, and Arsenal have invested 
$1.3B across 137 deals.118 It’s important to note that In-Q-Tel does not disclose all its investments, 
and therefore the amount raised in the defense startup space might actually be significantly higher. 
These early-stage companies span software, hardware, and healthcare. Most are security-focused, 
and some might not have a defense-specific product.   
 
Figure 8: Top 12 startups in the defense industry space 
Company Description Investors Funding 
Ayasdi Machine learning for 
complex datasets 
DARPA, GE Ventures, 
KPCB, Khosla Ventures 
$98M, Series C 
CounterTack Cybersecurity solutions 
for enterprise 
OnPoint Technologies, 
Goldman Sachs, Fairhaven 
Capital 
$68M, Series C 
Anomali Adversary detection & 
identification in networks 
In-Q-Tel, Paladin Capital 
Group, Google Ventures 
$56M, Series C 
Continuum 
Analytics 
Managing and visualizing 
big data 
DARPA, Silicon Valley 
Bank, General Catalyst 
$39M, Series A 
ProtectWise Cloud network DVR for 
real-time threat 
visualization 
Arsenal Venture Partners, 
Trinity Ventures, Crosslink 
Capital 
$37M, Series B 
Arctic Sand 
Technologies 
Rapid power conversion 
semiconductors 
Arsenal Venture Partners, 
GE Ventures, Northwater 
Capital Management 
$29M, Series B 
                                                
116 Ibid.  
117 CB Insights. 12 Early- and Mid-Stage Startups Backed by the CIA, Pentagon, and the US Army. September 6, 2016.  
118 Ibid.  
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Evolv 
Technology 
Threat detection to 
prevent mass casualty 
events 
In-Q-Tel, General Catalyst  $19.8M, Series B 
Fuel3D Handheld 3D scanner  In-Q-Tel, Chimera Partners, 
Parkwalk Advisors 
$11M, Series A 
Phantom 
Cyber 
Automated enterprise 
security operations to 
combat attacks 
In-Q-Tel, Blackstone Group, 
Rein Capital 
$9.2M, Series A 
Tribogenics Portable X-rays for 
mining, military, and 
medical imaging 
DARPA, Founders Fund, 
Flywheel Ventures 
$8.7M, Series A 
Algorithmia App store for algorithms, 
with private algorithm-
sharing platform for 
intelligence 
In-Q-Tel, Madrona Venture 
Group, Deep Fork Capital 
$2.5M, Seed 
Skincential 
Sciences 
Exfoliation for skin In-Q-Tel, Mercury Fund $300K, Seed 
 
Dataset: Early Seed-Stage Defense Companies 
For this paper, I explored the state of seed-stage defense companies, and what funding trends have 
been in the past few years. The startup field is not known for the quality of its data, much less 
publicly available data. However, organizations like Crunchbase, CB Insights, and Angellist have 
compiled some very extensive databases that track companies’ performance across funding 
rounds.  
 
Primary data was obtained from Angellist’s database of 384 publicly available startup profiles. I 
used Angellist because of its tagging system, where it is easier to search with general filters such 
as “Defense”. CB Insights, as a more research-oriented platform, does not yet offer a 
comprehensive repository of defense startups. Crunchbase, while very detailed, also does not have 
a good enough search function for a specific type of venture.  
 
Angellist has an extensive yet comprehensive database of Defense startups through their search 
engine.119 The search filter yielded 384 companies, 18,543 investors, 207,442 followers, and 99 
jobs as of May 2017. Overall, the average valuation for a defense startup on Angellist is $4.4M. 
The industry is closely related to Enterprise Software, which many Defense startups also tag 
themselves with.  
 
I used a combination of scraping and manual data gathering to compile a dataset for this paper. I 
ran into some issues scraping Angellist due to bot-blocking measures the website has. Prior to 
scraping/gathering data, I filtered the 384 search results by signal strength, which is a function that 
Angellist automatically offers. The signal measure is proprietary to Angellist, but common sense 
                                                
119 https://angel.co/defense 
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indicates it is probably a function of: a company’s followers, follower signal strength, amount 
raised, profile views, jobs offered, etc.  
 
I first took a random sample of 15 companies, 3 from each level of signal strength (ranging from 
1-5, with 5 being the strongest), and judged their quality. From this, I decided to include only the 
top 180 companies based on signal ranking, so as to not dilute the quality of my dataset. The 
companies I included in my dataset all had level 3 or higher signal.  
 
Data Cleaning & Processing 
The final dataset can be summarized by Fig. 8. All of the data is self-reported by the company in 
question.  
 
Figure 9: Angellist data 
Column Heading Explanation 
Date Joined The date the company created an Angellist account; a good indicator of 
when traction started to pick up 
Followers Number of people keeping tabs on the company 
City Headquarters 
Area What the company has tagged itself with, to appear in search results  
# of Employees 1 1-10 employees 
11 11-50 employees 
51 51-200 employees 
Description A required component of an Angellist profile; how the company 
describes itself and an overview of its product 
Incubators University labs & incubators the company was involved with 
Seed 1 Funding Amount raised 
Seed 1 Date Date the seed round was closed 
Seed 1 Investors VC & institutional investors 
Seed 1 Angels Individual investors 
Seed 2 Funding Amount raised 
Seed 2 Date Date the seed round was closed 
Seed 2 Investors VC & institutional investors 
… 
Seed 3 & Seed 4  
… 
Amount raised, date the round was closed, VC & institutional investors 
for Seed 3 & Seed 4. These are sometimes necessary for research-
intensive projects have grant renewals from DARPA, US Navy, US 
Office of Naval Research, etc. These grants are sometimes classified as a 
round.   
Series A Funding Amount raised 
Series A Date Date the series round was closed 
Series A Investors VC & institutional investors 
Series B Funding Amount raised 
Series B Date Date the series round was closed 
Series B Investors VC & institutional investors 
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Total Funding Summation of all funding; no startup in this dataset made it to Series C 
as of May 2017.  
Undisclosed 
Funding (Y/N) 
For startups that indicate a successful round, but do not disclose amount 
or investors. Undisclosed funding is more common for defense startups 
due to the nature of the industry.  
 
I then organized the companies into the following 4 categories: Series Funded, Seed Funded, 
Undisclosed Funded, and Unfunded.  
 
Data Analysis: Text  
I took the Area and Description data for the 180 companies and compiled text files to run the 
following 2 analyses:  
1. Area Analysis: Using the text files, I ran a text mining program to determine the most 
frequent tags used by companies across the 4 categories. For example: do Series Funded 
startups tend to have a certain focus within defense compared with Unfunded startups?  
2. Description Analysis: Using the text tiles, I ran the same text mining program to determine 
patterns in applications of product, type of platform, how the most successful companies 
positioned themselves, etc. I compared word frequencies between the most funded startups 
and the unfunded startups.  
 
Data Analysis: Funding Date  
Using the Seed 1/2/3/4 Funding Date, Series A Funding Date, and Series B Funding Date inputs, 
I plotted the amount raised vs time. I wanted to know how startup valuation fluctuated based on 
when a round was closed, and if a longer period between rounds impacted valuation.   
 
PART C: Qualitative Interviews 
 
To wrap up this paper, I also conducted a small number of interviews with leaders in the defense 
& aerospace industry (due to the significant overlap between the two industries). Table 5 
summarizes the 9 interviewees and their area of expertise within the defense industry.  
 
Figure 10: Interviews conducted within the past year 
Interviewee Expertise 
G.K. Corporate venture 
S.N. Venture capital 
T.G. Venture capital 
R.P. Consulting, 
Government 
R.F. Industry 
L.S. Private equity 
B.K. Industry 
J.M. Government 
E.C. Venture capital 
WH 399: Wharton Senior Research Seminar 
Innovation in the Defense Industry 
Prepared by Julia Peng for Professor Adam Grant & Dr. Utsav Schurmans on May 9, 2017 
 
 26 
SECTION III: ANALYSIS 
 
PART A: DoD R&D Spending Trends 
 
Data Analysis: General Spending Allocations  
The full results for general R&D spending allocation trends can be found in Appendices 1.0- 5.1. 
Upon review, there were a couple of findings that stood out.  
 
1. Analysis of Organization and Budget Activity: the contingency analysis measured 
how much funding is allocated towards each organization within RDT&E based on 
Budget Activity.  
 
In 2007, the Air Force started to spend significantly more in Budget Activity 07, 
Operational Systems Development. This can be seen in Fig. 5 & 6. While in 2006 the 
Air Force (Fig.5 green) prioritized System Development & Demonstration, in 2007 
every budget activity except for Operational Systems Development was cut (Fig. 6 
pink).  
 
 
Figure 11: 2006  
 
Figure 12: 2007 
 
This is a direct link to the increase in government investment in large-scale fighter jets 
such as the F-35. The acquisition process is structured in such a way that a project can 
be funded before any research & development can be completed. This is otherwise 
known as retrofitting, in which component parts are put into production before checks 
are conducted.120 Following some research completion, the manufactured parts are then 
sent back to production again for adjustments. Furthermore, all contingency plots were 
statistically significant, with !" < 0.0001. Statistical tests for this section can be found 
in Appendix 1.1.  
 
Most interestingly, correspondence analysis of Organization on Budget Activity 
indicate more collaboration between different organizations within the DoD. In Fig. 
13, we can see that R&D projects within the DoD has required more overlap between 
organizations. For example, in 1999, the DoD’s organizations were clearly delineated 
                                                
120 Vox. This jet fighter is a disaster, but Congress keeps buying it. Youtube. January 26, 2017. 
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in the type of research they conduct. In 1999, Budget Activity 05 (System 
Development & Demonstration) corresponds significantly to N (Navy), Budget 
Activity 04 (Advanced Component Development & Prototypes) corresponds 
significantly to A (Army). But in 2016, the only significant correspondence is between 
Budget Activity 02 (Applied Research) and DARPA.  
 
As innovation typically happens at the intersection of different fields, this could be a 
good indicator of increased collaboration; however more research would need to be 
conducted to eliminate the possibility of confounding variables.  
 
Figure 13: Correspondence analysis through the years. Full data can be found in Appendix 1.2.  
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2. Analysis of Funding Amount on Budget Activity: the oneway analysis compared 
allocation of funds to budget activities.  
 
Fig. 14 shows how distributions of funding varied throughout the years. The general 
trend is that Budget Activity 04 (Advanced Component Development & Prototypes) 
received the most amount of funding in every year. This is due to the Ballistic Missiles 
program, which requires a significant amount of capital.  
 
Statistical analysis can be found in Appendix 2.1, where individual t-tests were 
conducted for each Budget Activity pairing (21 pairings in total). The most significant 
differences tend to be between Budget Activity 04 and Budget Activity 07. Overall, 
funding allocations remained stable throughout the years, with the later years (2011-
2016) yielding more differences between the Budget Activity groups. This could be 
attributed to diversification of R&D across the different stages, from 01 to 07. In 1999, 
most funding was allocated towards 03 and 04. However from 2010 onwards, groups 
01, 02, and 03 started to receive more.  
 
Figure 14: FundingAmount on BudgetActivity. Full data can be found in Appendix 2.0.  
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3. Analysis of Funding Amount on Organization: the oneway analysis compared 
allocation of funds to organizations.  
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Fig. 15 shows how distributions of funding varied according to organization. This 
showed that categories such as the Air Force receiving increased funding throughout 
the years.  
 
Statistical analysis from Appendix 3.1 show that the most significantly different 
organization was the MDA (Missile Defense Agency), whose mean was continuously 
among the first in the Ordered Differences Report. In other words, on average, the 
MDA received a continuously higher stream of funding compared to all other 
organizations – to fund the ballistic missiles research program.  
 
Figure 15: FundingAmount on Organization. Full data can be found in Appendix 3.0.  
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4. Analysis of Funding Amount Difference on Budget Activity: the oneway analysis 
compared the yearly change in funding amount to budget activity.  
 
Fig 16 shows how each research budget activity asked for more or less funding year-
to-year. The change was calculated by subtracting the current year’s approved budget 
from the next year’s proposed budget.  
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Statistical analysis from Appendix 4.1 indicates that in most cases, there was not a 
statistically significant difference across all paired levels. That is to say, Budget 
Activity groups do not typically ask for or receive significantly more or less funding 
than others, compared to their current funds. The only Budget Activities that do are 
02, 04, and 05.  
 
Figure 16: FundingAmountDiff on BudgetActivity. Full data can be found in Appendix 4.0.  
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5. Analysis of Funding Amount Difference on Organization: the oneway analysis 
compared the yearly change in funding amount to organization. 
 
Fig 17 shows how each organization’s funding changed from year to year. Changes 
between years remained relatively stable, with the exception of MDA, which 
accounted for most of the statistically significant mean differences (Appendix 5.1).  
 
Figure 17: FundingAmountDiff on Organization. Full data can be found in Appendix 5.0. 
1999 
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2010
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Data Analysis: Specific Program Elements (Projects)  
After sorting through the data, I identified the top programs that received funding in each 
individual year. The programs are summarized in Appendix 6.0. Starting in 2011, the DoD 
dedicated a significant portion of RDT&E funding to Classified Programs. This is probably due to 
research projects in years 2010 & prior being declassified.  
 
The majority of the top-funded programs are in ballistic missile defense, fighter planes, and 
tactical. I found that the focus of defense research has remained broad and obviously focused on 
weapons and artillery.  
 
What was more interesting however, was my analysis on the number of projects that are currently 
funded, that were not funded (or did not exist) X years ago. Fig 18 shows a comparison of a 8yr 
timeline (blue) with an 3yr timeline (orange). For example, there are ~300 projects currently being 
funded that were not funded in 2008, and ~150 projects currently being funded that were not 
funded (or did not exist) in 2013. This can be used as a proxy for keeping up with research & 
innovation: if a specific year funded a similar number of projects from -8yrs and -3yrs ago, then 
the department is adopting newer technology at a faster rate. For example, 2010 and 2014 saw a 
similar number of projects adopted between the 2 time periods. The gap in recent years however, 
has actually widened rather than tightened.   
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Figure 18: Current projects funded that were not funded 8yrs, 3yrs ago 
 
 
PART B: Early-Stage Defense Ventures 
 
Data Analysis: Text  
The purpose of this part was to identify any trends between early-stage companies that have raised 
Series, Seed, Angel, and Undisclosed funding, to those that have been unsuccessful. I ended up 
with a database of 180 companies, and divided the 180 further into categories: Seed Funded, Series 
Funded, Undisclosed Funded, and Unfunded. The sub-categories refer to the most recent round 
raised. In other words, a company that has raised Series A funding will be classified as “Series 
Funded”, and excluded from “Seed Funded”.  
 
The results of text mining analysis are as follows.  
 
1. Area Analysis: “Area” in this case refers to the area of specialty that a startup is in. 
All areas in the Angellist database are self-reported, and there can be multiple tags 
used to make a startup searchable.  
 
Fig 19 shows the top tags with which a venture might describe themselves publicly 
online. The most frequent tags are obviously “Defense” and “Aerospace”, as these 
startups are in a defense database. However, it’s interesting to see that the funded 
startups tend to also associate themselves with a different industry, compared to the 
unfunded startups. For example, we see that Series Funded startups’ top tags also 
included Healthcare, Gas, and Oil. However, the Unfunded startups’ top tags included 
Security, Military, Drones, and DoD.  
 
There can be some interesting conclusions made from these findings. Firstly, startups 
that bridge different industries might have an easier time raising early stage and Series 
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A funding, because they have a more diverse set of investors to tap into. Secondly, 
investors might not want to be trapped with the federal government as the only 
customer/buyer. Thirdly, the convergence of different industries may actually yield 
more innovation: many impactful technologies are found at the intersection of 
different fields, or when techniques from one field are applied to another. And 
fourthly, these funded startups might not have originally been defense-focused. They 
might have originally been enterprise, health, or natural resources oriented, and later 
pivoted to defense. If this is the case, then defense innovation initiatives have been 
somewhat successful in doing their job: attracting companies that otherwise would not 
have thought about defense applications for their product.  
 
Figure 19: Areas of specialty of types of defense-startups, in order of most frequent  
 All 
Funded 
Seed 
Funded 
Series 
Funded 
Undisclosed 
Funded 
Not 
Funded 
Areas 
(tags) 
Defense 
Aerospace 
Healthcare 
Gas 
Oil 
Defense 
Aerospace 
Healthcare 
Gas 
Oil 
Defense 
Aerospace 
Healthcare 
Gas 
Oil 
Security 
Media 
Military 
Defense 
Security 
Clean 
Public 
Safety 
Aerospace 
Government 
Homeland  
Defense 
Aerospace 
Security 
Military 
Drones 
DoD 
 
2. Description Analysis: “Description” in this case refers to the text in the 1-2 paragraphs 
used as a company’s summary. Usually the description includes an overview of the 
company’s main product. Because the description is a requirement for an Angellist 
posting, I was able to gather text data for every necessary company.  
 
Fig, 20 shows the most frequent words used in a company’s description. While this 
technique might not allow for the most conclusive results, it still offers an interesting 
insight into the differences between the successful defense-related ventures and the 
unsuccessful ones. Firstly, most defense-related startups tackle data and software. This 
intuitively makes sense, as it is incredibly difficult for an early-stage venture to take 
on major weapons development. Software offers lower barriers to entry. Secondly, 
most Seed Funded startups seem to be focusing on wireless products and more 
efficient platforms. Thirdly, “intelligence” appears much more frequently in funded 
startups’ vocabulary than unfunded. Fourthly, it seems that funded startups (seed, 
series, and undisclosed) cover a broader range of applications. Most notably, startups 
with undisclosed funding have product applications in energy and software. 
Undisclosed funding in defense could mean an organization like In-Q-Tel is invested 
in, or another branch of the US government that requires confidentiality. If this is the 
case, it is not surprising that government-related agencies would want to invest in 
companies that have broader ranges than just defense. The more spillover effects to 
and from other industries,, the better for the investor. 
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Figure 20: Words in company descriptions, in order of most frequent. 
 All Funded Seed 
Funded 
Series 
Funded 
Undisclosed 
Funded 
Not 
Funded 
Des.  Data 
Platform* 
Market* 
Technology 
Wireless* 
Product 
Systems 
Defense 
Intelligence* 
Space 
Video* 
First 
Platform* 
Data 
Wireless* 
Will 
Product 
First 
Aviation* 
Space 
Market* 
Search* 
Can* 
Data 
Technology 
Systems 
Intelligence* 
Security 
Military 
Can* 
Data 
Technology 
Security 
Energy* 
Software * 
Data 
Systems 
Technology 
Military 
Will 
Defense 
Security 
Based 
World** 
Space 
Services** 
First 
* words that do not appear in unfunded startups’ most frequently used list 
** words unfunded startups use, that do not appear in funded startups’ list  
 
Data Analysis: Funding Date  
I wondered if there exists a relationship between funding date and the amount a startup was able 
to raise. I chose not to run this analysis on the Undisclosed and Series Funded ventures, due to lack 
of a large enough dataset for statistically significant results. For Seed Funded startups, there is a 
very slight relationship between the Seed Date and the amount raised. Fig 21 shows the 
relationship between when a company raised, to the amount they were able to raise. It is important 
to note that this data reflects the most recent funding amount. For example, the company that raised 
$250,000 in July 2008 (the left-most data point) has not received any additional followup funding 
since then.  
 
The results indicate that being able to raise money in a short amount of time is an important factor 
in fundraising later on – and thus, turning into a successful company. It is no coincidence that the 
companies with higher rounds tend to have raised the rounds recently. Fast fundraising is a good 
indicator of investor confidence, the robustness of the product development, and agility.  
 
This has important consequences for government agencies trying to work with Silicon Valley: if a 
startup gets caught in the long review & acquisition process, it could mean a lower valuation later 
on. Therefore it is even more important for more efficient collaboration between government and 
industry, especially in the early-stage venture space.  
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Figure 21: Funding date & amount raised for seed-stage defense startups (Angellist).  
 
 
PART C: Qualitative Interviews 
 
For the last part of this paper, I conducted a series of qualitative interviews with individuals 
involved in the defense industry. I ended up interviewing 9 people, from a diverse pool of 
backgrounds in defense: venture capital, consulting, government, private equity, industry, and 
corporate venture (innovation at a large defense company). All participants agreed to be 
interviewed for research & academic purposes.  
 
The interviews were all unstructured, and were conversational. The interviews included topics 
such as: the interviewee’s experience with innovation in their industry, the dynamics between 
small and big players, their opinion on new defense innovation initiatives, key segments to watch 
out for (including key technologies coming out of both government & commercial R&D), and 
what people have missed.  
 
Notes and main ideas from the interviews are summarized in Appendix 7.0, but I want to highlight 
some key points and tie them to my own research for this paper.  
 
1. Innovation and its impact: Most interviewees involved with venture capital and industry 
believe innovation to be a long-term trend, rather than a fad. The interviewee working in 
corporate venture, G.K., is optimistic about increased innovation, but views most of it as 
purely talk. J.M., currently working in government, stated that Secretary Carter’s oversight 
was underestimating the importance of the Hill. Without engaging Congress as much as 
possible, some of his initiatives will not survive for much longer. Back when I conducted 
the interview, he predicted that the DIUx won’t survive in 2017.  
 
2. Big vs. small players: Interviewees all agree that there is a very well established legacy in 
the defense industry, but differ on the extent of their importance. The most prominent 
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supporter of the industry primes, R.K., had spent his entire life at the Pentagon and now 
consults for defense-related projects. After the Cold War, the defense industry consolidated 
significantly, yet the core is still comprised of legacies. When asked about innovation 
trends, the interviewee responded: “When it really comes to innovation, it’s best done by 
existing contractors.” This was a different opinion from the rest of the interviewees, who 
were more optimistic about an early-stage venture’s chances of survival. For example, B.K. 
was personally involved with the rapid innovation experiments and successfully pitched a 
technology to senior management. His advice was to follow a grassroots method of 
innovation advocacy, and working with junior people across a broad range of departments. 
G.K. stated that military UAV contractors are finding it harder to compete with startup 
companies, because the industry is adopting more software. And while startups definitely 
lose out when it comes to weapons acquisitions, software is an advantage for a smaller 
venture. The industry primes recognize this trend, and have made changes to their in-house 
venture groups in response.  
 
3. Technologies: As L.S. stated, barriers to entry in this industry are extremely high. It is very 
difficult to win a customer like Boeing in less than a year. Most people with an investment 
mindset are focused on software, UAVs, and imaging. An interesting part of my interview 
with J.M. was around machine learning. While the DoD wants to adapt this technology, 
they are running into the Bandwidth Problem, where many people want to transmit data on 
network but there is not enough bandwidth in the field. In this case, there is a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the science.  
 
4. Government spending: I had a great conversation with S.N. about government budgets. 
Increasingly, the budget prioritizes and allocates funding to finished products rather than 
the actual research & development component. As a result, governments need to find other 
venues to fund their R&D – such as venture capital. Another venture capitalist, T.G., stated 
that people are more interested in commercial innovations that are not government-based. 
These two conversations supported my findings that successful startups in this space do 
not have to be defense-only. Rather, they can be companies with product applications in 
other spaces, and the transfer of technology to defense only strengthens innovation. On the 
other hand, R.P. gave a slightly different opinion: that budgets are purely functions of 
politics and world instability, and happen in geopolitical cycles. DoD’s budget does not 
fluctuate depend on if someone created a cheaper ballistic missile to target ISIS. If this is 
true, then it weakens some of my findings.   
 
5. Challenges: Almost everyone cited the entrenched, political acquisition process. B.K. 
spent a significant chunk of our interview talking about how Congress influences defense, 
and having Congress on your side is a huge competitive advantage (for example, Boeing 
forcing Airbus out of Alabama). A number of interviewees also cited the broken acquisition 
system, especially old aircrafts that the military doesn’t need, but Congress wants to keep. 
J.M. stated that we really need a greater number of players, and more attempts to take 
fundamental technologies and adapt them in useful ways. However, this is not a failure of 
technology. Rather, the underlying message from the majority of interviewees, is that the 
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major challenge lies in the organizational structure of existing companies & organizations, 
rather than our ability to invent.  
 
6. Sectors to watch out for: UAVs, machine learning, camera-based products, field 
deployable technologies (robotics, optics) 
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SECTION IV: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
Answering the Original Question 
The term “disrupt” has been dropped in conversation more frequently than it should – so frequently 
in some (startup) circles, that it has lost meaning. However unlike other industries, the defense 
industry’s extremely high barrier to entry – due to entrenched relationships between government 
and contractors – means that there is an opportunity for new companies to jumpstart innovation. 
Provided of course, that they have the cash on hand to survive the long procurement process.  
 
The question I initially set out to answer was: “How has interest in defense innovation manifested 
itself in practice over time, in government vs private sector?”, which can be broken down into:   
1. How successfully has the DoD’s R&D branch adapted to faster innovation cycles? 
2. How well do these spending patterns align with private industry investment preferences?  
 
After a lengthy data gathering and analysis process, I have the necessary results to attempt to 
answer these questions.   
 
How successfully has the DoD’s R&D branch adapted to faster innovation cycles?  
This study implied that the DoD is not blind to the increasing rate of technology advancement. I 
say this not because of the DoD’s public statements, but by their actions: it seems that the RDT&E 
organizations have adapted to faster innovation cycles by conducting research more 
collaboratively. This was seen in increased inter-organization research projects, demonstrated by 
correspondence analysis. While in 1999 each organization tended to focus on a specific type of 
budget activity (for example, the Navy leading System Development & Demonstration while the 
Air Force leading Operational Systems Development), in 2016 the only strong correspondence 
was between DARPA and Applied Research. This makes sense, because DARPA was established 
to conduct more Applied Research. While I cannot prove a causal relationship between increased 
collaboration and innovation in either direction, it is still an important correlation to be aware of.  
 
However, this study also implied that despite shifting towards a more collaborative process, actual 
outcomes may not be fully realized. After tracking funding patterns for specific projects within 
RDT&E, I found that the department funded fewer projects that were previously unfunded 3 years 
ago, compared to unfunded 8 years ago. This is not a tautological argument, because I was 
interested in the funding difference between the two periods. If the RDT&E branch wanted to take 
advantage of faster innovation cycles, they would also be prioritizing newer projects & 
technologies. Therefore, the funding gap between a shorter time period (3yrs) and a longer time 
period (8yrs) should ideally be decreasing, or at least stable, over time.  
 
How well do these spending patterns align with private industry investment 
preferences?  
This study found that the organization that tends to receive the most R&D funding is MDA. This 
also makes intuitive sense because ballistics requires a significant amount of funding, and is a 
priority for any military organization.  
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In my analysis of private sector investments, I found that the most successful startups within 
defense have diversified product applications across a number of different industries. This can be 
seen in how more successful startups (startups with seed and series funding) tag themselves with 
areas such as healthcare, cleantech, oil, and gas. This can be due to a variety of reasons. For 
example, it might be easier to raise funding if the company is not constrained to only one industry 
or buyer, as is the case with selling to military. It also might be an indicator that initiatives like the 
DIUx and other defense innovation programs working: these programs make it easier for 
companies previously in other industries to translate their product/technology to defense. 
However, more research would have to be conducted.  
 
The same seems to apply to startups’ descriptions. Text mining analysis indicated more successful 
defense-related startups describe themselves with a broader range of words.   
 
And finally, this study also indicated that the more recently a startup raised, the more funding they 
seem to have closed. While more research would need to be conducted, this potential finding could 
have important consequences for the DoD’s strenuous acquisitions process. Because the 180 
startups were categorized based on their most recent round, a startup classified under Seed Funded 
that closed the round in July 2008 means they have not raised any follow-on funding since. This 
implies that the successful startups are ones that can fundraise quickly and therefore have higher 
valuations. Intuitively, this makes sense: if a company’s product is good, investors are quicker to 
sign checks. This finding validates the reason why there is a disconnect between Silicon Valley 
and the DoD: a startup simply cannot survive the lengthy review process, no matter how good their 
product is.  
 
Discussion of Limitations  
There are some clear limitations to this paper. Firstly, I did not have full clearance for budget data. 
While I tried to gather as comprehensive of a database as possible, all analysis was conducted with 
unclassified information. While this should not detract from the quality of my analysis, it does 
leave out a very important and significant aspect of budget & spending. In fact, classified data is 
probably one of the best indicators of military technology innovation.  
 
Secondly, I have no insider knowledge on how decisions are made at the DoD, nor the reasoning 
behind certain funding decisions. This information is not accessible without security clearance or 
experience working at the department.   
 
Thirdly, I do not have full insight into the defense funding ecosystem, simply due to the 
confidential nature of certain investments (ex. In-Q-Tel). Doing research in early-stage ventures is 
difficult because of unconsolidated, messy data & the extremely fast pace of tech development.  
 
Further Research 
I began researching this paper in late October 2016, and made my initial proposal in December 
2016. I did not finish gathering & cleaning my data until late March, and only made my findings 
in April. Going forward, future research should be conducted on the following areas:  
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1. Collaboration levels across DoD’s branches throughout the years, drawn from either 
budget allocation for projects or personnel. A number of management researchers have 
studied weak vs strong ties within and across organizations.121 It would be interesting to see 
the same analysis conducted with employees in government and defense-specific branches. 
The goal could be to see if there indeed has been more collaboration and inter-
organizational work, which can yield more collaborative ideas.  
2. Applications of defense products to other industries, or adoption of technologies from other 
industries to defense. The dataset I used in this paper was a fairly specific one. Going 
forward, it would be interesting to see if these results hold across a larger dataset of early-
stage ventures. If I had more time, I would have conducted an analysis of companies’ 
products myself and looked at direct technological applications.  
3. Startup funding cycles and valuation. The analysis I conducted regarding fund timing was 
with a limited dataset. In the future, it would be interesting to test this idea out on a broader 
dataset, if such a dataset exists.  
4. Earlier last semester, I wanted to measure innovation by comparing survivability rates with 
healthcare funding in the DoD budget. The intuition was: if I find that over time the DoD 
spent less on medical technology, but soldier survival rates remained constant or even 
increased, it could mean that the DoD has successfully innovated. In other words, 
innovation can be defined as “spending less but doing more”. However, I was unable to 
access a large enough dataset to be able to run this analysis. In the future however, this 
could still be an interesting test to run.  
 
Conclusions  
About two years ago, I joined the Penn Aerospace Club because I thought building model rockets 
was a cool thing to do. Within a few weeks, I found myself helping LightSpeed Innovations with 
a research project on aerospace investment trends. Soon after that, I attended Wharton Aerospace 
Ventures 2016 in SF, where I heard Steve Blank give a keynote speech on the need for better 
innovation systems in the defense industry (his solution was Hacking 4 Defense). Having been a 
Canadian Air Cadet during junior high, this topic fascinated me. Thus began my journey into the 
academic field of defense innovation.  
 
The major problem with researching defense innovation is in a lack of clear metrics: how does one 
measure innovation? While many people jump to funding, it’s important to note that more 
investment does not necessarily mean more innovation. While at first I was hesitant to use budget 
data (because it’s publicly available, chances are someone has already conducted the necessary 
analysis on them). However, I soon realized after sorting through the existing literature and reports, 
that there was still some valuable conclusion to be drawn from budget data – especially when 
compared to private sector trends.  
 
While this paper is by no means comprehensive or sufficient enough to capture the complexities 
of the enormous industry that is defense (and aerospace), it has given me a good start. There 
remains a lot of work to be done here. This topic is not one with which I can run controlled 
                                                
121 Uribe, Jose and Dan Wang. Learning from Others, Together: Brokerage, Closure and Team Performance. Collective 
Intelligence. 2014.  
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experiments in to gather data. Rather, meaningful research in this area means sorting through raw 
data (budget, Congressional speeches, administrative) and being able to draw conclusions from 
them.  
 
Looking ahead, I sincerely hope that the new administration continues to prioritize defense 
innovation and form collaborations with the private sector. Defense innovation initiatives can live 
or die by the Secretary and elected officials. Despite the weaknesses of the DIUx, it is an important 
program that should be continued in one form or another – especially as its funding is a drop in 
the bucket compared to the defense budget as a whole.  
 
Thank you for your time in reading this paper.   
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SECTION V: APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1.0: Contingency analysis of Organization on BudgetActivity 
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Appendix 1.1: Statistical significance of contingency analysis of Organization on BudgetActivity  
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Appendix 1.2: Correspondence analysis of Organization on BudgetActivity 
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Appendix 2.0: Oneway analysis of FundingAmount on BudgetActivity  
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Appendix 2.1: T-test of oneway analysis of FundingAmount on BudgetActivity 
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Appendix 3.0: Oneway analysis of FundingAmount on Organization 
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Appendix 3.1: T-test of oneway analysis of FundingAmount on Organization 
 
1999 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
WH 399: Wharton Senior Research Seminar 
Innovation in the Defense Industry 
Prepared by Julia Peng for Professor Adam Grant & Dr. Utsav Schurmans on May 9, 2017 
 
 50 
    
 
  
WH 399: Wharton Senior Research Seminar 
Innovation in the Defense Industry 
Prepared by Julia Peng for Professor Adam Grant & Dr. Utsav Schurmans on May 9, 2017 
 
 51 
Appendix 4.0: Oneway analysis of FundingAmountDiff on BudgetActivity 
 
1999 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
2016 
 
 
 
WH 399: Wharton Senior Research Seminar 
Innovation in the Defense Industry 
Prepared by Julia Peng for Professor Adam Grant & Dr. Utsav Schurmans on May 9, 2017 
 
 52 
Appendix 4.1: T-test of oneway analysis of FundingAmountDiff on BudgetActivity 
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Appendix 5.0: Oneway analysis of FundingAmountDiff on Organization 
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Appendix 5.1: T-test of oneway analysis of FundingAmountDiff on Organization 
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Appendix 6.0: Individual project funding within the DoD 
 
Year Top 15 Program Elements  
2016 Classified Programs 
Classified Programs 
Classified Programs 
Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Long Range Strike 
Ohio Replacement 
AEGIS BMD 
CH-53K RDTE 
KC-46 
F-35 - EMD 
Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD 
Ballistic Missile Defense Targets 
CHALK EAGLE 
Executive Helo Development 
2015 Classified Programs 
Classified Programs 
Classified Programs 
Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
AEGIS BMD 
Long Range Strike 
Ohio Replacement 
KC-46 
Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives 
CH-53K RDTE 
CHALK EAGLE 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD 
Advanced Nuclear Power Systems 
RQ-4 UAV 
Ballistic Missile Defense Targets 
2014 Classified Programs 
Classified Programs 
KC-46 
Classified Programs 
Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
AEGIS BMD 
Advanced Submarine System Development 
F-35 - EMD 
Manned Ground Vehicle 
Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives 
CHALK EAGLE 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD 
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CH-53K RDTE 
Ballistic Missile Defense Targets 
Defense Research Sciences 
2013 Classified Programs 
Classified Programs 
F-35 - EMD 
Classified Programs 
AEGIS BMD 
Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD 
RQ-4 UAV 
Manned Ground Vehicle 
Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives 
CH-53K RDTE 
Advanced Submarine System Development 
CHALK EAGLE 
Defense Research Sciences 
Ballistic Missile Defense Test 
2012 Classified Programs 
Classified Programs 
Classified Programs 
Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
AEGIS BMD 
Manned Ground Vehicle 
Advanced Submarine System Development 
F-22A Squadrons 
Joint Tactical Radio System - Navy (JTRS-Navy) 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD 
CH-53K RDTE 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
CHALK EAGLE 
RQ-4 UAV 
2011 Classified Programs 
Classified Programs 
AEGIS BMD 
Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Classified Programs 
Manned Ground Vehicle 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 
GPS III Space Segment 
Joint Tactical Radio System - Navy (JTRS-Navy) 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD 
Advanced Submarine System Development 
CH-53K RDTE 
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F-22A Squadrons 
DDG-1000 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
2010 AEGIS BMD 
Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Classified Programs 
Manned Ground Vehicle 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 
GPS III Space Segment 
Joint Tactical Radio System - Navy (JTRS-Navy) 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD 
Advanced Submarine System Development 
CH-53K RDTE 
F-22A Squadrons 
DDG-1000 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
RQ-4 UAV 
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors 
2009 Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
AEGIS BMD 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors 
Ballistic Missile Defense Terminal Defense Segment 
Joint Tactical Radio System - Navy (JTRS-Navy) 
F-22A Squadrons 
Satellite Communications (SPACE) 
CH-53K RDTE 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
Advanced Hawkeye 
Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
Aircraft Modifications/Product Improvement Programs 
GPS III Space Segment 
Defense Research Sciences 
2008 Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
AEGIS BMD 
Ballistic Missile Defense Terminal Defense Segment 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 
Joint Tactical Radio System - Navy (JTRS-Navy) 
Advanced Hawkeye 
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors 
F-22A Squadrons 
Satellite Communications (SPACE) 
Advanced EHF MILSATCOM (SPACE) 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
CH-53K RDTE 
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Information Systems Security Program 
MILSATCOM Terminals 
Tactical Technology 
2007 Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 
Ballistic Missile Defense Terminal Defense Segment 
AEGIS BMD 
Joint Tactical Radio 
Satellite Communications (SPACE) 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
Advanced EHF MILSATCOM (SPACE) 
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors 
Advanced Hawkeye 
Information Systems Security Program 
Space Tracking & Surveillance System 
Army Test Ranges and Facilities 
Tactical Technology 
Special Programs - MDA 
2006 Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Ballistic Missile Defense Terminal Defense Segment 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
Advanced EHF MILSATCOM (SPACE) 
Advanced Hawkeye 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
Satellite Communications (SPACE) 
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors 
Information Systems Security Program 
Aircraft Modifications/Product Improvement Programs 
EA-18 
Army Test Ranges and Facilities 
Tactical Technology 
Defense Research Sciences 
2005 Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Ballistic Missile Defense Terminal Defense Segment 
Advanced EHF MILSATCOM (SPACE) 
Advanced Hawkeye 
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors 
Satellite Communications (SPACE) 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 
Information Systems Security Program 
Defense Research Sciences 
Advanced Aerospace Systems 
EA-18 
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Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
Tactical Technology 
C-5 Airlift Squadrons (IF) 
2004 Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Ballistic Missile Defense Terminal Defense Segment 
Advanced EHF MILSATCOM (SPACE) 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
Information Systems Security Program 
V-22A 
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors 
Satellite Communications (SPACE) 
Special Programs 
Defense Research Sciences 
Advanced Aerospace Systems 
RETRACT MAPLE 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
Test and Evaluation Support 
Tactical Technology 
2003 Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD 
Advanced EHF MILSATCOM (SPACE) 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
V-22A 
Information Systems Security Program 
Defense Research Sciences 
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors 
Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
Surface Combatant Combat System Engineering 
Test and Evaluation Support 
Marine Corps Assault Vehicles 
Chemical and Biological Defense Program 
Artillery Systems - EMD 
Chemical and Biological Defense Program - Advanced Development 
2002 Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Ballistic Missile Defense Terminal Defense Segment 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD 
Advanced EHF MILSATCOM (SPACE) 
V-22A 
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors 
Information Systems Security Program 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
Defense Research Sciences 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program (SPACE) - EMD 
Test and Evaluation Support 
Marine Corps Assault Vehicles 
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Surface Combatant Combat System Engineering 
F/A-18 Squadrons 
University Research Initiatives 
1999 Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
Classified Programs 
F/A-18 Squadrons 
V-22A 
Defense Research Sciences 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program (SPACE) - EMD 
Test and Evaluation Support 
Advanced Electronics Technologies 
Information Systems Security Program 
Information Systems Security Program 
Other Helo Development 
New Design SSN 
University Research Initiatives 
University Research Initiatives 
University Research Initiatives 
Total Classified Programs 
Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse Defense Segment 
Classified Programs 
AEGIS BMD 
Ballistic Missile Defense Terminal Defense Segment 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High EMD 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 
Classified Programs 
Advanced EHF MILSATCOM (SPACE) 
Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors 
Defense Research Sciences 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD 
Information Systems Security Program 
Test and Evaluation Support 
Satellite Communications (SPACE) 
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Appendix 7.0: Summary of qualitative interviews 
 
Interviewee Expertise Notes 
G.K. Corporate 
venture 
• Despite talk of innovation, there is still a very well established legacy in 
the industry (the “primes”) – Lockheed, Boeing 
• Increasingly interested in data collection from satellites, machine 
intelligence and sensors, vision, cameras 
• Military UAV-focused contracts are finding it hard to compete with 
young startup companies 
• The aerospace industry is adopting more software: primes like Boeing 
can’t compete with this. Increasingly, ventures are more focused on 
commercial opportunities instead of just military 
• Upsides of commercial: low cost, high value, legacy players do not hold 
a monopoly advantage  
• Lockheed has revamped their venture group, and other legacy companies 
realize the disruption in the industry 
• This is a long-term disruption, not a fad 
• Segments of interest: UAVs, machine intelligence, satellite, space 
industry, camera-based developments, connectivity 
S.N. Venture capital • Trend of technology miniaturization 
• More government budgets are being allocated to finished products, 
instead of figuring out how to actually build something: they need to find 
other places to fund their R&D, such as venture capital  
• Segments of interest: camera, vision  
T.G. Venture capital • Works with a strategic investment firm focusing on early stage 
technology companies 
• Interest in more commercial innovations that are not government-based 
• Business models for some of these defense ventures are pretty unclear  
• Segments of interest: field deployable technologies (robotics, optics, 
materials, power sources), hardware, launch vehicles, optical imaging 
R.P. Consulting, 
Government 
• Previously at the Pentagon, long history in consulting and private equity 
• Lots of consolidation: when the Cold War ended, the defense department 
had a “last supper” and consolidated the 15 aerospace primes  
• We need fewer primes: Lockheed, Boeing. There used to be 15 primes, 
now there are 7  
• Each of the 15 primes in the past had 10,000 suppliers. This created over-
abundance of small regional suppliers, which was very inefficient and 
costly 
• However the core industry is still primes 
• All the disruptive innovation (defense and commercial) are sponsored by 
the government through DoD or NASA. When it really comes to 
innovation, it’s done best by existing contractors 
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• “If there was a good enough technology idea, DoD and NASA would 
have already encouraged Lockheed to carry it out.”  
• Companies like SpaceX are a terrible waste of capital  
• For “new innovations”, take it to DoD and NASA, and come back in 10 
years if it works. Innovation is risky, and does not interest primary 
customers in the industry  
• Defense department budget is a function of politics and world instability. 
There will be cycles. Defense department budgets do not fluctuate 
depending on if someone came up with a cheaper way to design a 
ballistic missile to target ISIS  
• Defense department has instituted restrictive laws about transferring 
technology, so you can’t sell a single bolt without going through the 
DoD. This has slowed the process of globalization 
• Segments of interest: established companies with reliable cashflows  
R.F. Industry • We should focus less on venture funding, and instead focus on the 
number of companies successfully establishing revenue streams  
• Despite this, R&D is still an important aspect of innovation 
• Segments of interest: supply chain 
L.S. Private equity • Barriers to entry are extremely high – you can’t win a customer like 
Boeing in a year. Therefore there is not a lot of new entrance. Instead, the 
trend is people moving up the food chain (starting out at a smaller 
company for moving parts, moving to assemblies, becoming a bigger 
player)  
• Long-term shift towards composite materials and away from metals  
• Segments of interest: UAVs, unmanned aircrafts 
B.K. Industry • Defense is a multi-billion dollar acquisition process 
• The US military has a specific set of problems they address, otherwise 
impossible to do business with them 
• Congress likes a lot of money in their individual districts. We want 
proficiency, but also as many Congressional districts to vote in favor of 
an acquisition project 
• Bureaucracy is established around career civil servants and military, with 
no experience in nimble processes 
• Lobbying plays a huge part (obviously). Ex: Airbus built a plant in 
Alabama to have US presence, Boeing protested and Congress came to 
defend them. Boeing won and Airbus sold out. Incumbent players hold a 
lot of power 
• Rapid Innovation Cell (RIC): to push back against industry primes 
• RIC’s 3D printing experienced significant pushback from other 
companies.  
• Strategy: recruit 10-15 junior people, lower to mid-management 
positions. Give them the ability to travel around and see different 
technologies, and pick out the ones the most interesting to pitch to upper 
command. Grassroots process.  
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• People at the senior level like innovative ideas, but are quick to 
bureaucratize everything  
• The problem is mostly the mid-tier middle managers, who have no 
incentive to be innovative. These people are the ones who stop the 
process. They can’t be fired and can’t be pushed to change  
• Would be interesting to study the psychology of a middle manager in 
DoD  
J.M. Government • Experience in tech, Treasury, DoD, DIUx 
• Ash Carter missed engaging the Hill, and therefore his newer initiatives 
have no life span. The DIUx won’t survive in 2017, the budget 
authorization is still being budgeted 
• Sectors that have the most need for innovation: military education, 
personnel, Defense University, systems and technology 
• We have very old aircrafts that are still out there being flown because we 
haven’t gotten one that’s better. Congress doesn’t want to get rid of it, 
but the military doesn’t want it 
• Relationships between startups and government important 
• Machine learning: defense really likes to talk about this, but there is a 
fundamental difference in how machine learning actually works. The 
Bandwidth Problem: not enough bandwidth out in the field, and a lot of 
people want to transmit the data on network. There is a lack of 
understanding the science 
• Everyone wants reform, but no one’s been able to do it 
• In past, military and government have been major funders of basic 
research. This isn’t necessarily bad: the government is not in the best 
position to commercialize. The trouble arises when Lockheed has special 
relationships with government 
• We need a greater number of players, more attempts to take fundamental 
technologies to adapt in useful ways 
• Procurement process is deeply political and dominated by large 
companies. There are however, a few VC-backed companies that do 
deals with government 
• VCs want to put their money in more typical Silicon Valley firms  
• CIA is only intelligence agency that’s not within the DoD, and IQT 
works for them. IQT therefore only does work that benefits a small 
portion of the picture  
• Capital =/= ability to navigate the process. Government needs to be a 
better customer to startups.  
E.C. Venture capital • Industries are struggling to harness non-technical innovation 
• Innovation cycle is a lot faster: it feels like people can’t keep up 
• A small company brings a product to market, and a few weeks later 
people already want the next thing  
• DoD doesn’t won the technology, and most of the budget doesn’t go into 
investments in the market anymore  
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• People in the government still want to have control (the mindset is still 
there), but they are not able to keep up  
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